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Archive for the ‘BP’ Category

Underestimating a Silent Problem

Tuesday, June 22nd, 2010

Risk. Exposure. Liability. These are words that should be at the forefront of every conversation when a silent problem is identified ( a problem that has been avoided, neglected, gone unnoticed, or been intentionally silenced). The reason being, too often we underestimate the real impact a silent problem can have on an organization, and its share price. For instance, we need look no further than Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Madoff, Toyota, and now BP. In each of these and 100s of other of instances, while the crisis on the surface appeared under control, in reality things were totally out of control. Such can be the impact of a silent problem.

 In a recent Reuters article titled Wall Street Said Buy, Buy, Buy BP Stock As Gulf Crisis Unfolded illustrates how analysts often underestimate the financial impact of disasters that eminate from silent problems. The story states:

As early word of BP’s Deepwater Horizon blowout began spreading, investors panicked. After closing above $60 before the April 20 disaster, the energy giant’s shares plunged almost 20 percent in New York, to below $50, in just two weeks.

It is not hard to understand why. Even then, the out-of-control oil spill in the midst of rich fishing grounds and nearby resort beaches raised the specter of horrific damages and untold potential liabilities.

Yet, nearly to a person, the dozens of securities analysts who followed the British oil giant were unfazed. As BP (BP.N: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) (BP.L: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) shares continued to drop, most were screaming the same message: buy, baby, buy.

Credit Suisse, which had a “buy” rating on the stock at the time, did not even mention the accident in an April 28 report. The firm upgraded earnings estimates after BP reported strong quarterly results the day before.

A day later, with BP’s shares then down 11 percent, Citigroup’s Mark Fletcher weighed in. He argued that the decline was “disproportionate to the likely costs to the company, even assuming damages can be claimed.” In the same report, he estimated BP’s total share of the cleanup at just $450 million — today, conservative guesses put the figure at $10 billion to $20 billion.

Around that time, Morgan Stanley was among the chorus citing the strong rebound of Exxon (XOM.N: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) shares after the 1989 Valdez tanker spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska, as a reason to be bullish. “We think the sell-off presents an attractive buying opportunity for investors with medium-term investment horizons,” the firm wrote.

All told, 27 of 34 analysts tracked by Thomson Reuters rated the stock “buy” or “outperform” as recently as May 11. The other seven rated the shares “hold.” There was not a single rating of “sell” or “underperform” among those tracked.

The BP crisis is horriffic. It’s impact will be felt for years, and probably decades. And when we look at the evidence, it was a problem being intentionally silenced, and no one screamed Wolf!

BP’s Silent Problems Now Being Exposed

Monday, June 14th, 2010

Business consultant Pat Murray proclaims, “You stand for what you tolerate. Define your intolerables.” Well in a recently authored letter by two house democrats that have been leading the BP oil spill investigation, the concept of “what you tolerate” applies. According to a recent Washington Post article, it states,

– BP saved $7 million to $10 million using a more risky option for the well casing, or steel tubing. The safer option, known as the liner-tieback option, would have provided more barriers to prevent the flow of natural gas up the space between the steel tubes and the well wall.

– BP failed to install enough devices to center the pipe in the hole, which increased the danger of cracks in the cement surrounding the pipe. The American Petroleum Institute’s recommended practices warn that if the pipe, or casing, is not centered “it is difficult, if not impossible” for the cement to displace the drilling mud on the narrow side of the opening.

– BP decided against a nine- to 12-hour procedure known as a “cement bond log” that would have tested the integrity of the cement. Although BP had a team from Schlumberger, a leading oil services firm, on board the rig, BP sent the team home and told them their services were not needed.

– BP did not fully circulate drilling mud, which would have taken as long as 12 hours. That would have helped detect any pockets of gas, which later shot up the well and exploded on the deck of the drilling rig.

– BP did not secure the connections, or casing hangers, between pipes of different diameters.

The letter says that many of these decisions contradict the advice contained in other BP internal documents, which warned against the dangers of using certain types of pipe. And it reveals that even before the accident, BP engineers were struggling with unusual difficulties. On April 14, BP drilling engineer Brian Morel e-mailed a colleague, Richard Miller, saying “this has been [a] nightmare well which has everyone all over the place.”

In the book Without Warning, it states, “Silent problems absolutely define what you tolerate.” Quite simply, individuals inside BP were willing to “tolerate” actions and activities that did not pass internal standards. Instead of thoroughness, corners were cut. To achieve what? A deadline? A budget? An incentive clause? Whatever the reason, billions of dollars are now lost and thousands of lives are caught in the crosshairs. This at times is the tragic outcome associated with silent problems.

Bottomline: The BP oil spill was avoidable if they had taken the precautions necessary to ensure a safe well. Now they will pay the price for their neglect.

Be the one to see it coming!

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Without Warning - Rondey Johnson

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